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AbsTrAcT
History teems with instances of “man’s inhumanity to man.”  some wrongs are 
perpetrated by individuals; most ghastly evils were committed by groups or nations. 
other horrific evils were established and sustained by legal systems and supported by 
cultural mores.  This demands explanation. I describe and evaluate four common ex-
planations of evil before discussing more mundane and psychologically informed ex-
planations of wrong-doing.  examining these latter forms helps isolate an additional 
factor which, if acknowledged, empowers us to diagnose, cope with, and prevent 
many ordinary and serious moral wrongs.  In so doing, I do not assert that the expla-
nations of first call are never appropriate.  I claim only that their role is smaller than 
many of us reflexively suppose, and that the role of the later feature I identify is more 
significant, in part, because it supports and amplifies the more mundane and psycho-
logically informed factors prompting wrong-doing.
“Evil is unspectacular and always human, and shares our bed and eats at our own 
table.”
W.H. Auden “Herman Melville” (1939)
History teems with instances of “man’s inhumanity to man.” some acts are the 
work of isolated individuals, like serial killer Andrei chikatilo or con man bernie 
Madoff. Many especially ghastly evils were perpetrated by nations or groups: the 
Holocaust, the stalinist’s purges, and the slaughter of Tutsis in rwanda. other hor-
rific acts like slavery were established and sustained by legal systems and supported 
for centuries by cultural mores. Then there’s politics. I find comments by many can-
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didates and policy advocates alternately maddening and depressing. I am aghast at 
claims people utter with a straight face—assertions I assume they have to know are 
false. Finally, there are the everyday actions  towards and comments to strangers, 
colleagues, family, or friends—things that hurt them deeply. When we survey the 
history of humankind, we have to wonder: how can so many of us act so callously—
and occasionally savagely—toward others? Is there some feature or trait of us that 
explains our misbehavior?
People occasionally attribute wrong-doing to agents’ defective mental states; 
more commonly they cite the agents’ morally tainted characters. ethicists may intel-
lectually embrace more sophisticated explanations. However, in my experience many 
of us resort to the same explanations proffered by the person on the street: we re-
flexively cite what I dub “the explanations of first call.” I describe four variations on 
these. Although these are not devoid of explanatory merit, none adequately explains 
many moral wrongs. We need a different and more robust explanation.
The search for that explanation begins by isolating more mundane—and psy-
chologically informed—explanations of prudentially and morally misguided behav-
ior. I show how understanding these factors points to a more general trait which, 
if acknowledged, would equip us to better understand, diagnose, respond to, and 
prevent many ordinary and serious moral wrongs. The vice I identify is a common 
and partly controllable human tendency that causes or undergirds numerous wrong-
doings, in part by amplifying the injurious effects of those mundane factors as well as 
behaviors explained by the explanations of first call.
undersTAndInG My cLAIM
The trait I specify near the end of this essay does not fit standard ways of ranking 
vices. Let me explain why I deviate from common approaches. someone might hu-
morously propose that we identify the greatest vice cartesian style: the greatest vice 
is the one greater than which none can be conceived. This proposal does no work. 
others might rate vices by the degree to which they expose the “darkness” of their 
possessors’ hearts (whatever precisely that means). This approach likely includes 
Milo’s notion of “preferential wickedness” (Milo, r. d. 1984: chapter 3): the desire 
to do what it is wrong because it is wrong. others might follow Judith shklar (who 
followed Hume) in asserting that cruelty is the most despicable vice. “cruelty,” as she 
defines it, is the “deliberate and persistent humiliation [of others] so that the victim 
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can eventually trust neither himself not anyone else” (shklar, J. n. 1984: 37; Hume, d. 
1978/1740: 459). As loathsome as these traits are, I argue that they are not as common 
as we suppose and that people having such traits are unlikely to shed or alter them. 
Finally, we could rank vices aesthetically, so that the greatest vice is the one we find 
morally the ugliest. I understand the appeal of this approach; however, it has peculiar 
consequences. Pervasive hypocrisy is profoundly ugly. However, I doubt that it is the 
source of significant swaths of wrong-doing.
The fact that there are so many diverse characterizations shows that there is no 
single metric for ranking vices. (That is why my title ends with a question mark.) I 
have no doubt that these familiar categorizations are serviceable. each isolates dis-
tinctive reasons why people sometimes morally misbehave. However, all overlook or 
obscure a propensity I find more salient. We can see the vice’s importance if we focus 
not on its bare character—its ugliness or darkness—but on the myriad ways in which 
it functions in our lives. The vice I identify is serious because it is one to which we are 
all susceptible; it is frequently overlooked in ethical debate; it produces, permits, or 
sustains mountains of moral wrongs, and it is amenable to some control. While we 
have little chance of purging ourselves of preferential wickedness or extreme cruelty, 
many of us can corral the excesses of the vice I identify.
However, I am getting ahead of myself. before reaching the argument’s climax, 
I must engage in some academic foreplay. I must explore the explanations of first call 
and show why they will not do much heavy moral lifting. Although they do explain 
some wrong-doing, they explain less than many people suppose. Perhaps more im-
portantly, most afflicted with these commonly cited vices are either unable or unwill-
ing to change.
reflexive explanations of Wrong-doing
Many people reflexively claim that an agent’s wrong-doing springs from her 
flawed moral character. even trained ethicists often proffer this explanation as in-
dividual moral agents, even if, when acting as professionals, they acknowledge its 
inadequacies.
occasionally, people claim or imply that the misbehaving agent was insane. 
This explanation is most commonly deployed when someone commits an especial-
ly gruesome crime. “could (the cannibal) Jeffrey dahmer be sane?” someone might 
ask rhetorically. “or (the spree murderer) Adam Lanza?” The answer, the questioner 
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assumes, is “no.” In these cases our rhetorical interlocutor might be correct if she 
interprets insanity by some legal criterion or as a form of psychopathology. However, 
although insanity in either sense doubtlessly explains some serious wrong-doing, 
unless we interpret the term “insane” trivially, there is no reason to think that many, 
let alone most, Germans or cambodians or russians or Turks or Hutu supporters 
of their respective genocides were insane. since this explanation is plausible in only 
a few cases, I won’t say anything further about it. I turn to the three variants of the 
more common claim that agents’ wrong-doing flows from their flawed characters, in-
cluding both defective motivations and reprehensible moral values reflected in be-
havioral dispositions.
cHArAcTer FLAWs
Amoralism
some people claim that agents who act wrongly are frequently indifferent to 
morality. Amoralism takes two forms. The first stems from the agent’s beliefs; the 
second, from her behavior.
on the first, the agent believes—or claims to believe—that morality is an illu-
sion: there are no genuine moral requirements. on the second, the agent is disposi-
tionally indifferent to morality (Milo, r. d. 1984: chapter 3; brink, d. o. 1989: 46). For 
purposes of this paper, I shall assume that amoralism in the first sense is false. Were it 
true this paper would be misguided. If there was no morality, then there would be no 
moral vices; if there are no vices, there could be no greater or lesser vice. However, I 
shall not here defend the claim that morality is not an illusion.
What about the second variation? doubtless some people do not care if there 
are moral demands. It is intriguing, however, that most of those who claim not to care 
about morality act as if they do care, at least when they are harmed. If someone harms 
them, they rarely say (or think) “There’s nothing wrong with what the person did; I 
just don’t like it.” Most will aver that the other’s behavior is wrong. Moreover, when 
others morally object to her behavior—or she anticipates that someone might—she 
usually proffers a justification of or explanation for her actions. The accused indi-
vidual usually (a) denies that the event occurred; more commonly, she (b) explains 
why the behavior is not what we think it is (it is loyalty or patriotism or self-defense 
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rather than genocide), or she (c) explains why we needn’t respond in the ways most 
people think we should (with revulsion, anger, disappointment, guilty, etc.) (cohen, 
s. 2001: 7—11). doubtless some who offer these explanations are simply seeking to 
insulate themselves from criticism. However, since those who proffer these “justi-
fications” frequently appear to be sincere, I charitably conclude that many of these 
people do not embrace behavioral amoralism. There are, of course, some who really 
do not care about morality. I am inclined to think that such people exemplify a trait 
better described as immoralism.
Immoralism
When Jo claims that bill acted badly because he has a flawed character, she might 
simply mean that bill regularly acts viciously or selfishly even if he does not see, ac-
knowledge, or understand his behavior in those ways. I consider these options later. 
I focus here is on what Milo calls “preferential wickedness” (1984: esp. chapters 2 and 
7). on Milo’s view, bill is preferentially wicked if he knows that his actions are wrong 
but does them without the slightest misgiving. This view is similar to what stanley 
benn simply calls “wickedness” (1985). I suspect this notion could also include what 
shklar deems “cruelty” (1984: chapter 1). not all instances of preferential wickedness 
are cruel, but arguably all instances of cruelty would exhibit preferential wickedness.
The belief that many wrong-doers are immoralists is a staple of private judgment 
and public discourse. In the united states, most liberals and conservatives do not see 
each other as “essentially decent [men] . . . man who [are] either temporarily misguid-
ed by false doctrines, or forced to [do the things they do] . . . against [their] better will 
and desire” (Gray, J. G. 1998/1958: 159). Instead, many liberals think most conserva-
tives are selfish and mean-spirited moral busy-bodies, while many conservatives con-
sider most liberals morally empty, personally irresponsible, arrogant tyrants. similar 
views permeate the international arena. Former President bush identified four na-
tional regimes as “The Axis of evil.” His claim clearly resonated with a significant 
portion of the American people. This view also animates Goldhagen’s assertions that 
most German perpetrators of the Holocaust were motivated by demonstrably insidi-
ous views (1996).
despite our professional protestations to the contrary, most of us reflect an un-
conscious commitment to immoralism when criticizing those who we think mistreat 
us, our families, or our friends. If Katrina says something false to me or my family, 
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I am prone to claim or assume that she is dishonest or a manipulator. If rowena is 
insufficiently sensitive to me or my family, I am prone to claim or assume that she is 
crass or hateful, etc. It is not merely that Katrina and rowena regularly act callously; I 
assume each knows that what she did was immoral. The tendency to attribute other’s 
morally deficient behavior to defective motives is well documented in experience and 
in the psychological literature (Watson, d. 1982: 682; Knobe, J. and Malle, b. 2002: 6).
However, historians have long noted that immoralism is an inadequate explana-
tion even for many heinous evils. As Tony Judt crisply put it (Judt, T. and snyder, T. 
2012: 34):
By the 1980s it was a commonly held view among specialists in the field that the 
history of Nazism, and indeed of totalitarianism in all of its forms, could not be 
fully grasped if it was reduced to a tale of malevolent persons consciously and delib-
erately engaging in criminal acts with harm in mind.
Judt is correct. Although immoralism is sometimes an appropriate attribution, it 
alone does not adequately explain much immoral behavior. even those who commit 
genocide rarely consider their actions immoral. even fewer do it because it is immoral. 
Hitler certainly didn’t (synder, T. 2015). Many Germans who actively participated in or 
passively supported the Holocaust thought that by imprisoning and killing Jews they 
were protecting their families and defending the Fatherland. We find these people’s 
beliefs mysterious and their behavior objectionable, regardless of how they explain 
their actions to themselves. Moreover, we have reason to think that they should have 
known that they were acting immorally. Albert speer admitted at the end of the war 
that he should have known (Van der Vat, d. 1997). However, to say that someone 
should have known is not to say that she did know, let alone that she consciously knew. 
The best explanation for such people’s wrong-doing is not that they were preferen-
tially wicked. As christopher browning and others have argued, many atrocities were 
perpetrated by seemingly ordinary, generally decent, people who lacked the cognitive 
and moral wherewithal to see that what they were doing was wrong . . . and to resist 
the societal pressures to act outrageously (1992). I have no doubt that we should deem 
their obliviousness a moral defect. However, it is not what most people commonly 
mean when they assail others’ characters. This is the first indication of what I shall 
identify as the greatest vice.
The same is true of Pol Pot who was largely responsible for the death of one 
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million cambodians in the “Killing Fields.” When he was interviewed twenty years 
later, he said that although he had made mistakes, “even now, you can look at me: am 
I a savage person? My conscience is clear” (Mydans, s. 1997). Pot’s claim exemplifies 
his commitment to the belief that only a savage person could commit genocide. He 
assumed that since he was not consciously savage, then he could not be preferentially 
wicked. That is a mistake. His behavior was morally outrageous because of what he 
did, not because he consciously chose to act wickedly. This suggests why immoralism 
is incapable of explaining even many grotesque evils.
The failure of immoralism to explain wrong-doing is even more obvious when 
evaluating the Inquisitions’ overseers. over several hundred years, church officials 
tortured or killed thousands of alleged heretics. It is implausible to think most of 
those officials were consciously motivated by immorality. Indeed, is seems more likely 
that most thought they were acting virtuously. The church, and even some who were 
tortured, interpreted that torture as a form of spiritual purification (Glucklich, A. 
2001: especially pp. 16—32). Finding it hard to understand how they held such views 
does not show that they did not hold them. We must try to understand how ordinary, 
generally decent, people could endorse morally odious beliefs and act in morally 
monstrous ways. being able to explain that helps isolate what is arguably the greatest 
vice.
Finally, we saw the same phenomenon at work in the u.s.’s systematic mistreat-
ment of African Americans. It began before American independence, continued 
throughout constitutionally sanctioned slavery, and was still a dominant feature of 
most African American’s lives for at least a hundred years after slavery’s official end. 
This treatment of African Americans was morally disgraceful. However, I see no 
reason to think that most perpetrators were driven by consciously malicious intent. A 
majority of these citizens thought the constitution, the laws, the u.s. supreme court 
decisions, and local practices were at least permissible and perhaps morally required. 
I sheepishly admit that that is what I thought growing up. We whites had a ready 
explanation for our discriminatory policies and practices. Admittedly, our purported 
justifications were ludicrous. yet, embrace them we did.
This explains why I think the behavior of many nazis, Inquisitors, and ordinary 
southerners—no matter how morally objectionable—cannot be explained by im-
moralism. These all-too-familiar actions must be explained differently. Perhaps these 
people were simply selfish.
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selfishness
Many people claim other’s bad behavior stems from their decision to promote 
their own interests over those of others, to make an unjustified exception of them-
selves. This is doubtless a common cause of wrong-doing. However, describing 
people’s behavior this way masks a crucial moral difference between conscious and 
unconscious selfishness. Many people talk as if selfish people are consciously aware 
that they are being selfish. I seriously doubt that. When it is true, I think it is more 
accurate to say these people exhibit a form of immoralism.
More commonly, people who behave selfishly are not consciously selfish. If 
someone criticizes them, they quickly redescribe the circumstances or their behavior 
so that their actions appear to be unselfish or at least permissibly selfish. of course, 
this may be just a rationalization to inoculate them from moral censure. Many times, 
though, it reflects people’s sincere, even if misguided, belief that they are not selfish.
The justifications, explanations, and excuses people use to explain (away) their 
apparent selfishness—like explanations and excuses people use when accused of all 
forms of wrong-doing—are variations on morally plausible ones. If they weren’t, 
agents would not use them and no one would deign to accept them. seeming wrong-
doers rarely cite either demonstrably irrelevant or morally repugnant justifications. 
When Jo is asked why she cheated beth, she doesn’t say, “because squares have four 
sides” or “because I wanted her money.” When Pol Pot was asked why he sent mil-
lions of urbanites into rural areas incapable of sustaining them, he didn’t say “for 
years paint contained lead” or “I didn’t like the slant of their eyes.” These are not ex-
planations Jo or Pol Pot or ratko Mladic would use because no reasonable or morally 
sensitive person would buy them. People offer rationales “learnt by ordinary cultural 
transmission,” drawn from a “well-established, collectively available pool” (cohen, 
s. 2001: 59; inspired by Mills, c. W. 1940: 905—7). For instance, those who commit 
genocide or discriminated against blacks claimed that they were removing threats, 
promoting public safety, or treating others as they deserved. each purported justifi-
cation is plausible in some contexts (Mills, c. W. 1940). We all use justifications like 
them; sometimes we find them plausible. The proffered justifications have no moral 
purchase in these cases not because they are of the wrong type, but because their factual 
elements are false in those contexts: Jews were not threatening Germany; cambodian 
urbanites were not undermining an ideal Asian society; African Americans were not 
sub-human.
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unconscious forms of “selfishness” are powerful precisely because the agent 
does not acknowledge them even to herself (Pronin, e., Lin, d. y. et al. 2002; Pronin, 
e. 2009). Were she vividly aware of what she was doing and why she was doing it, 
then she might act differently. ultimately we should discern why people so often fail 
to accurately understand their actions and motivations.
The most fruitful place to search for an explanation is by exploring common 
sources of imprudent and inappropriate behavior. These are familiar to most thought-
ful adults; many have also been extensively studied by social scientists.
FAMILIAr sources oF MIsGuIded beHAVIor
Most people who act immorally are not preferentially wicked: they do not do 
what they consciously know to be evil; certainly they do not do it because it is evil. 
Many are not consciously selfish. even if they were evil or selfish, they were not so 
in the ways most people suppose when they brandish these explanations of first 
call. These agents’ behavior is better explained as springing from a multiplicity of 
interacting and mutually reinforcing cognitive defects which the agent does not see 
or acknowledge. These lead people to rely on dubious premises, to misdescribe the 
situations in which they act, to misunderstand their motives, and to be blind to the 
likely consequences of their actions. by carefully examining our own behavior and 
the behavior of others, we can identify and understand the nature and power of these 
defects. understanding them opens a route for identifying, and subsequently limit-
ing, controlling, or correcting these cognitive and moral defects.
Ignorance of relevant information
We sometimes make good choices when we are ignorant; but if we do, we are 
lucky. We can reliably make wise choices only if we have the relevant knowledge to 
hand and use it. However, we need not be walking encyclopedias. Most of us, most 
of the time, can successfully navigate life even if we are ignorant of many details. 
except in rare circumstances, I do not need to know the how many miles it is from 
Los Angeles to Tokyo or the name of the 9th President of the united states. This 
information would only rarely be relevant to important decisions. but sometimes ig-
norance leads to abysmal decisions.
There are five broad types of ignorance that can derail prudential and moral 
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choices, often by enabling us to concoct (to ourselves and others) less than convinc-
ing explanations of why our actions are not what others deem them to be. one, I may 
lack information defining the context in which I act. If I buy 100 acres in the Arizona 
desert to plant an apple orchard, I will have wasted my money. If I mistakenly think 
that someone is threatening me or my family, I may inappropriately harm them “in 
self-defense.”
Two, I may be ignorant of relevant history. If I unknowingly father a child with 
my biological sibling, our offspring has an increased chance of developing a mild to 
severe disability. If, as chair of an academic department, I do not understand that 
a female faculty member’s low research output resulted from years of systematic 
discrimination by the previous chair, then I may inappropriately deny her research 
leave. If I do not know that the united states aided in the overthrow of the democrat-
ically elected Prime Minister of Iran, and then financially and militarily supported 
the shah’s strong-armed dictatorship for more than three decades, I will not com-
prehend why many Iranians distrust the u.s. I may subsequently support misguided 
decisions about the appropriate foreign policy toward Iran.
Three, if I am ignorant of human motivation and psychology, I may have difficul-
ty understanding others’ behavior; thus, I may be less likely to relate to them appro-
priately. If I think all people (save me) are always out to promote their selfish interests, 
then I will not trust them; hence, I will never have genuinely intimate relationships. 
If I assume all Muslims are terrorists and all atheists are immoral, then I am unlikely 
to befriend either and will likely be ineffective when teaching them; I will also likely 
support policies detrimental to them.
Four, if I do not understand the nature and significance of institutions in de-
termining what people believe, what and who they like and dislike, and what they 
do, I will make ill-advised prudential decisions or harmful moral ones. If I do not 
understand the ways that my preferences and beliefs are shaped by my social class, 
economic order, or religious affiliation, then I cannot control or counter their perni-
cious influences (Mill, J. s. 1985/1885: 39). I may thus choose a career because of its 
high status only to discover I find that career unsatisfying. or a 1950s man may have 
assumed that women were instinctively meek, oblivious to the ways in which the 
political, economic, social, and religious orders of the day discouraged them from 
openly expressing their views.
Five, if I am ignorant of the information or skills required to reasonably predict 
the likely consequences of my (and others’) action, I will often act inappropriately. I 
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am more likely to make misguided predictions if cannot grasp basic concepts of prob-
ability theory, am ignorant of relevant background information, or lack critical rea-
soning skills to use the available information to make plausible predictions. If in 2010 
I spent my life savings purchasing Greek bonds assuming I would reap massive long-
term dividends, I will have squandered my retirement income. If I am ignorant of the 
dangers of radiation, I may make an unwise decision about living (or not living) near 
a nuclear power plant. I may likewise make bad choices about whether to support 
building two new ones near the Grand canyon or the Forest of dean.
There is one additional consideration we must not forget. In the cases men-
tioned heretofore, the agents were ignorant simpliciter. However, ignorant people 
are typically ignorant of their ignorance. even worse, many people think that they 
know “what just ain’t so” (billings, J. 1876). Thus, it is often not bare ignorance that 
misleads us (Judt, T. and snyder, T. 2012: 265); it is ignorance coupled with the false 
belief that we are knowledgeable.
IGnorAnce’s coGnITIVe cousIns
sometimes we have easy access to relevant information but fail to apprehend, 
attend to, or employ that information when making a decision. Put differently, in-
formation is available but is not motivationally potent. It is better to discuss these 
cognitive belches separately from bare ignorance.
Inattention
Inattention occurs when we do not attend to the relevant knowledge to hand. I 
know the dangers of walking on a rocky hillside or drying the dishes. However, when 
I am doing these activities, I sometimes do not attend to what I am doing. I subse-
quently tear the ligaments in my ankle or break a serving bowl. or I may have a lin-
gering sore in my mouth. Although I abstractly know that such sores are early cancer 
signs, I do not attend to them until my next physical checkup, at which point I realize 
they have been gracing my mouth for seven months. Like other cognitive hiccups, 
inattention can be morally loaded. A friend asks me if I will be attending a particular 
professional meeting; he wants to talk. Without asking myself why he would make 
this request, I decline: I tell him that I am too harried. I later discover that he has a 
fatal debilitating disease. He wanted to commiserate with an old friend. I felt like a 
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heel. still do. He could, of course, have been more insistent. However, had I been 
more observant and sensitive, he wouldn’t have needed to be.
If he had been insistent and I still refused, then we could conclude that I was 
selfish. However, had I known that he was ill, I would have almost certainly have at-
tended that meeting. That suggests that my vice was not being consciously selfish, 
it was that I did not bother to think about why he made this request. Knowing that 
does not make me feel better about myself. It does, however, more clearly locate the 
problem and thereby gives me a way to avoid making similar mistakes in the future.
short-sightedness
Another cognitive cousin of ignorance is short-sightedness. We may know what 
we should do to promote our long term interests, but focus instead on our immedi-
ate desires. We want a second serving of potatoes, an extra scoop of ice cream, or a 
fourth beer; we guide our actions by our immediate cravings rather than a pursuit for 
our long-term health. We are tired and skip our planned cardiovascular, strength, or 
stretching exercises one day without considering that in so doing we may be slightly 
less likely to do them tomorrow.
We can also make morally fraught short-sighted decisions. In our desire to be 
safe from criminals or terrorists, we may support imprudent and immoral long-term 
policies. out of a fear of crime, the u.s. now has the highest incarceration rate of any 
country in the world, and our criminal justice system does little to rehabilitate crimi-
nals or to fully readmit them to society once they have served their time (LaFollette, 
H. 2005). We should not be surprised that the country’s recidivism rate is embarrass-
ingly and objectionably high.
Psychologists claim that short-sightedness springs from several cognitive 
biases, especially the availability and representativeness heuristics (Tversky, A. and 
Kahneman, d. 1974: 1125-28). These biases were originally identified as explanations 
for why humans often make flawed judgments of probability. For instance, most 
people are unduly optimistic in assuming that neither they, nor a member of their 
family, will become seriously ill (dunning, d., Heath, c. et al. 2005: 72); yet many are 
unduly afraid that they will die in an airplane crash. Later psychologists deployed 
these mechanisms to explain why we often focus on short-term consequences and 
dramatic recent events when deciding what to do.
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selective Attention
selective attention is another cousin of inattention in which the information 
is not only available; it is ready to hand. nonetheless, we are oblivious to relevant 
factors and focus on insignificant ones. When one student criticizes us while another 
praises us, we often embrace the positive evaluation uncritically and then scour for 
ways to discount the other student’s negative comments. In its more common guises, 
selective attention is a form of bias, oft described in the literature as either “confirma-
tion bias” (Lord, c. G., ross, L. et al. 1979) or “information avoidance” (Melnyk, d. 
and shepperd, J. A. 2012).
biases
We are biased not simply in the sense that we tend to make predictable judgments 
about others and ourselves. since we are habitual agents, we all do that. sometimes 
habitual action is innocent; occasionally, it is fortuitous (or even laudatory)—if, for 
instance, I reflexively tell the truth (LaFollette, H. 2007: chapter 14). However, this is 
not what I—or most people—mean by being “biased.” Most of us are biased in that 
we make some important moral judgments without the relevant evidence. In other 
cases, the evidence is easily available, but we are indifferent to or do not attend to it.
We are not just biased, we are biased about our biases (ehrlinger, J., Gilovich, 
T. et al. 2005: 2). even those of us aware of the human proclivity to be biased assume 
we have escaped this tendency to which others are vulnerable. We assume that we 
would know if we are biased. However, biases are potent because they are largely out 
of sight. They operate unconsciously by shaping how we see and interpret events and 
persons. Generally, they leave no directly accessible introspective cues (nisbett, r. e. 
and Wilson, T. d. 1977; Pronin, e., Lin, d. y. et al. 2002: 372-73; ehrlinger, J., Gilovich, 
T. et al. 2005: 7). biases are especially potent forms of the final common source of 
wrong-doing: ignorance of one’s self.
IGnorAnce oF seLF
some forms of ignorance and its cognitive cousins are instances of limited self-
knowledge. others arise from it. All are exacerbated by it. To the extent that we 
are ignorant of ourselves, we often: (a) don’t know what we know and don’t know, 
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(b) don’t know what we do and why we do it, (c) don’t understand how and why we 
judge others as we do, and (d) don’t see or acknowledge our own biases. of course 
few people are completely ignorant of themselves. However, our knowledge of self is 
selective. There are behaviors and traits we all occasionally miss; some of us do not 
see them at all. Most of us think our more negative traits are less serious and less nu-
merous than they are. We then focus on our (perceived) positive traits, yet focus on 
the (perceived) negative traits of others, especially people we dislike.
Although most of us acknowledge that some people lack self-knowledge, we 
think that unlike the hoi polloi, we know who we are, what we do, and why we do 
it. We think that if someone does not know herself she must be intellectually lazy. 
The belief that self-knowledge is the norm clashes with ben Franklin’s famous quip: 
“There are three things extremely hard: steel, a diamond, and to know one’s self.” It 
is also at odds with volumes of empirical studies (dunning, d., Heath, c. et al. 2005: 
69—70):
In general, people self-view hold only a tenuous to modest relationship with their 
actual behavior and performance . . . . People’s general evaluations of their skills 
and character . . . [are not] tethered very tightly to objective performances in tasks 
that should reflect those skills and character traits . . . . [Moreover], when people offer 
specific predictions about how they will behave in a particular future situation, they 
make predictions that differ systematically from their actual behavior when that 
situation arrives.
Here are some specific examples of people’s mistaken views of themselves:
•	 People’s rating of their intelligence correlates between .2 and .3 with their 
scores on IQ tests and their performance on intellectual tasks . . . . (dunning, 
d., Heath, c. et al. 2005; Hansford, b. c. and Hattie, J. A. 1982).
•	 70% of high school students thought they were above average in leadership 
ability; only 2% rated themselves as below average. Virtually all thought they 
were at least average in their ability to get along with others. one-fourth 
thought they were in the top 1% (dunning, d. 2005: 7).
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•	 People on average rate themselves at the 64th percentile of those possess-
ing a series of desirable traits (e.g., sophisticated, disciplined, sensible), while 
they rate themselves at the 38th percentile on a series of undesirable traits 
(e.g., neurotic, impractical, submissive) (dunning, d. 2005: 103).
It is not difficult to see how these forms of ignorance may lead to morally odious 
action.
How could This be?
We are ignorant of ourselves because most of us acquire many beliefs about our-
selves through introspection. Introspection can be valuable, but only when it has 
been trained by experience, candid feedback, and rigorous scrutiny. bare introspec-
tion has limited epistemological value. suppose that after “looking inside” I conclude 
that I am humble since I do not spend hours consciously thinking about how terrific 
I am. However, if others see that I regularly toot my own personal and professional 
horn and behave haughtily toward others, then I am not humble.
If I claim to be generous simply because I contemplate—and have pleasant 
thoughts about—helping others, but everyone else sees that I am stingy and incon-
siderate, then my claim is undermined, the limits of my introspection are exposed. 
our characters are defined not by an inner state to which each person has direct 
access, but by the ways that we regularly behave. There are, of course, exceptional 
circumstances in which one’s deeper disposing traits are not exemplified in current 
behavior. However, these exceptions are not the stuff of which an adequate account 
of character is constructed.
This is uncontroversial when attributing non-moral traits to others. everyone 
recognizes that Joan’s sincerely believing that she is intelligent or athletic or hard 
working does not make her so. If she commonly makes ignorant and inane claims, she 
is not intelligent. If she cannot lift thirty pounds, walk half a mile, or swim one lap in 
a small pool, then she is not athletic. If most people who work with her consider her 
a dawdler, then she is not hard-working. These non-moral traits are determined by 
what she does, not by thoughts traipsing through her brain. Why would we think it 
is different with morally laden traits?
We all see this when evaluating others’ moral traits. no one seriously considers 
that Pol Pot was saintly because he did not, upon introspection, discover a “savage 
person” inside. When we want to morally understand others, we observe their be-
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havior and we ascribe traits based on our “background beliefs about motives, reason, 
abilities, and biases.” yet, somehow, when we think about ourselves, most of us 
ignore or downplay these common and indisputable sources of self-information. The 
tendency to rely unduly on introspection and the failure to actively protect ourselves 
from ignorance and its cognitive cousins are not limited to the dull and uneducated 
(Pronin, e. 2009: esp. pp. 5-9). Professors have this tendency in spades. ninety-four 
percent of us claim to be “above average” professors (dunning, d. 2005: 7).
How to we explain these errors? It is not merely that many of us are bad at intro-
specting—although that is true enough. The core problem is that we expect intro-
spection to provide what it cannot reliably supply (ballantyne, n. 2015: esp. 149—52). 
Much of what we want to know about ourselves is simply not accessible introspec-
tively. our behavior and motives are often shaped by implicit attitudes and pref-
erences we cannot detect directly. We cannot “see the origins of our beliefs or the 
causes of our motives” (Pronin, e. 2009: 18). This leads many of us to think that while 
others are susceptible to manipulation, we are relatively immune to it. We also assume 
that we know others better than they know us (Pronin, e. 2009: 17). It is one of many 
biases to which we are all susceptible.
some people have more sophisticated accounts of self-knowledge. They ac-
knowledge the limits of introspection. They see that they must also observe their 
behavior. I would like to think that I am such a person. nonetheless I (and many like 
me) am too often blind to what I do because I frequently privilege my own introspec-
tion and am insufficiently attentive to my behavior.
WHAT THIs reVeALs AbouT THe 
sources oF WronG-doInG
With these explorations to hand, we return to the question with which we began: 
how can so many people perpetrate, or be complicit in, ordinary and extreme wrong-
doing? How did so many seeming decent Germans come to support the slaughter of 
Jews and other minorities? How could many southerners keep African Americas as 
slaves? How did they and their children support lynchings and other aspects of Jim 
crow? How could devoted church leaders kill and torture people because they failed 
to embrace the “correct” faith or had the audacity to suggest that the earth revolves 
around the sun? How and why did a veteran like Timothy McVeigh cavalierly deto-
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nate a bomb in front of the federal building in oklahoma city killing 168 people and 
wounding nearly 700 more?
none of these phenomena is primarily, let alone entirely, captured by the ex-
planations of first call. It is doubtful that many of these perpetrators were insane, or 
that many thought that what they were doing was morally wrong; it is unlikely that 
most were consciously selfish. That does not mean the behaviors were not immoral 
or selfish. It is to say that many, and arguably most, thought that what they did was 
morally permissible; some thought it was morally required. From our vantage point, 
we find their beliefs incomprehensible. We want to know: how could anyone have 
believed that? The answer, drawn from the ordinary experience, history, and psycho-
logical studies, is that they were ignorant when they should have known; they did not 
see what was in front of them; they did not notice that they were focusing on their 
own interests; they were oblivious to their own biases.
Generally put, they did not think carefully about what they believed, what they 
did, and why they did it. often they unquestioningly embraced the factual and moral 
claims of their culture, their parents, their teachers, their friends, their leaders, or 
their favorite political commentator. They were oblivious to the power of institu-
tions to create and sustain preferences and beliefs. They made few—and perhaps 
no—efforts to protect themselves from these foreseeable sources of error.
We would like to think that we are different: that we could not have done what 
they did. but do we have any reason to think that we are unique? Most—and prob-
ably all—of us are inadequately self-reflective. The problem is that while most of us 
abstractly acknowledge our ignorance (Mill, J. s. 1985/1885: 17),
few [of us] think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or 
admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain may be one of 
the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable.
Mill’s insight provides a way of framing an unnerving thought experiment. Most 
of us wonder how our parents or grandparents or teachers or business people or gov-
ernment officials could have believed and done the things they did. doubtless, they 
almost certainly had similar thoughts about their parents and grandparents. What we 
should ask ourselves is: what will our children and grandchildren find equally incom-
prehensible about our actions and beliefs? This thought gives me the moral shivers.
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PuLLInG ToGeTHer THe sTrAnds oF THe ArGuMenT
If I am right, we should not reflexively employ the explanations of first call: 
wrong-doing is infrequently the result of insanity, amoralism, preferential wicked-
ness, or conscious selfishness. More commonly, wrong-doing results from ignorance 
(of history, background information, and the power of social, economic, and religious 
institutions), unconscious selfishness, ignorance of self, and (unconscious) biases. 
These cognitive failures blind us to the relevant moral dimensions of our actions. 
They lead relatively ordinary folks to engage in morally objectionable, or even hor-
rendous, behavior. That is what Hannah Arendt meant by the “banality of evil” and 
what Aleksandr solzhenitsyn meant in proclaiming that “the line dividing good and 
evil cuts through the heart of every human being” (solzhenitsyn, A. I. 1973: 168).
If we have any hope of being on the morally proper side of this line, we must 
engage in frequent, honest, and rigorous self-reflection. If we understood our igno-
rance, we might correct it. If we acknowledged our selfishness, we might constrain it. If 
we recognized our biases, we have some chance of restricting their sway (Kahneman, 
d. 2011: 722—68).
of course, self-knowledge does not come simply via introspection. I would have 
hoped that would have been clear by now. We can identify the means for obtaining 
self-knowledge by slightly rewording Mill’s description of a wise man (1985/1885):
In the case of any person whose judgment [about herself] is really deserving of con-
fidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of 
his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could 
be said against [his views about himself] . . . Because he has felt that the only way 
in which a human being can make some approach to knowing [himself] . . . is by 
hearing what can be said about [about his actions and motivations] . . . by persons 
of every variety of opinion, and studying [them all]. No man ever acquired [self-
knowledge] . . . in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to . . . 
[gain self-knowledge] in any other manner . . . 
I am not the first to urge that we acknowledge this moral flaw. bishop butler did 
the same nearly two hundred years ago (1827: 127):
[M]any men seem perfect strangers to their own characters. They think, and reason, 
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and judge quite differently upon any matter relating to them, from what they do 
in cases of others where they are not interested. Hence it is one hears people expos-
ing follies, which they themselves are eminent for; and talking with great severity 
against particular vices, which, if all the world be not mistaken, they themselves are 
notoriously guilty of.
THe GreATesT VIce?
I propose that the greatest vice is our failure to engage in frequent, honest, and 
rigorous self-reflection. We insufficiently scrutinize our own behavior; we too quickly 
excuse our own callous behavior. Why would I suggest that this is such a serious 
vice? recall my proposed criteria at the beginning of the paper. one, the “greatest” 
vice would be one to which we all succumb; two, it receives scant attention by phi-
losophers and people in the public arena. Three, it directly and indirectly explains 
much wrong-doing. Four, it is a source of wrong-doing most within our control. If we 
are insane, we likely cannot cure it. If we are amoral or preferentially wicked, we are 
unlikely to change. However, if we recognize our ignorance, short-sightedness, inat-
tention, and biases, we have some chance of corralling, controlling, and correcting 
these errors (Montmarquet, J. A. 1993).
The cognitive failings and biases of which I have spoken are part of who we are. 
sometimes they even serve important evolutionary purposes (Kahneman, d. 2011: 
45-46). To that extent, our bare susceptibility to these flaws is not the vice of which 
I speak. The vice is in making no, or only half-hearted, attempts to scrutinize our 
own motives and behavior. not everyone is immoral or amoral or pervasively selfish. 
However, everyone is inclined to be insufficiently self-critical; that is why all of us 
occasionally act badly without acknowledging our misbehavior (butler, J. 1827: 128):
There is plainly, in the generality of mankind, an absence of doubt or distrust, in a 
very great measure, as to their moral character and behavior . . . [this arises from] 
their not reflecting, not exercising their judgment upon themselves.
We cannot battle the vice of which butler speaks simply by engaging in more in-
trospection. We must carefully observe what we say and do. We must listen to others’ 
criticisms of or comments about us, and then take active precautions against these 
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nasty propensities. once we grasp our susceptibility to this vice, we should detect 
ways in which cognitive deficiencies distort our motives, choices, and actions. We 
then have some chance to counter these deficiencies: directly, by changing ourselves; 
indirectly, by altering the external circumstances (including the institutions) within 
which we think, choose, and act (doris, J. M. 2002, 2015). The later route to change 
explains why my proposal is compatible with situationism: sometimes the most effec-
tive way of changing behavior is not by brute will but by changing our environments 
to reinforce more laudatory behavioral dispositions (LaFollette, H. 2007: chapter 14).
If we do, we can change how we see, understand, and relate to others. We are 
more likely to be charitable in interpreting their behavior. We would be less likely 
to reflexively resort to immoralist assumptions about them; we would resort to these 
claims only if impelled by the preponderance of evidence. We would instead search 
for a more sophisticated understanding of other agents’ behavior and motivations. 
That will inform our search for effective ways to change their behavior. If we assume 
that they are misinformed or careless or short-sighted, we can explain why we think 
they are mistaken. They will not want to hear our explanations, especially if they are 
not only ignorant, but convinced that they indisputably know the truth, as is many 
such people’s wont (recall the earlier billings quotation). We must vigorously search 
for ways to expose their ignorance and disabuse them of their faux knowledge. This 
will not be easy or simple. I hold no illusions that they will like hearing our analyses. 
nonetheless, most people will prefer this to brutal assaults on their character.
Moreover, were we to concretely admit our own propensity to make these moral 
errors, we would be less morally uppity. That does not mean that we will be indiffer-
ent to morality. nor does it mean than we need to be so skeptical or worried about 
mistakes that we are afraid to act. What it does mean is that we should admit our 
fallibility; we she should watch ourselves like moral hawks. We should acknowledge 
and genuinely consider other’s moral criticisms of us. We should be willing to change 
ourselves accordingly.
I propose that each of us should scrutinize ourselves as much as—and prefer-
ably more than—we scrutinize others. our control over others is always indirect. 
our control over ourselves, albeit circumscribed, is more direct and more extensive. 
We have an opportunity to find ways to better relate with family, friends, colleagues, 
clients, students, and strangers, ways to create and sustain a more civil and civilized 
world.
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concLusIon
none of this denies that some people are insane, preferentially wicked or con-
sciously selfish. However, it would be better were these to be explanations of last 
resort rather than ascriptions of first call. sure, there are the bernie Madoffs who 
will bilk people out of their life savings without a hint of concern. However, I am 
not primarily concerned here about the character or actions of moral monsters. I am 
concerned far more with common sources of wrong-doing of which we are all guilty, 
more often than we dare admit to others or ourselves.
What I have suggested is both radical and ordinary. It is radical inasmuch as it 
reveals the limits of reflexive explanations for wrong-doing. It is ordinary inasmuch 
as we are all vividly aware of ways the unself-reflective actions of others cause sig-
nificant harm. Indeed, it is so commonplace, the claim might seem to border on the 
trivial. expect for one thing. even when most of us recognize in the abstract just how 
dangerous a lack of serious self-reflection is, we tend to forget or ignore this fact in 
the concrete.
Although this may not be the most despicable vice, or the vice greater than 
which none can be conceived, given the kinds of creatures we are, this vice causes 
enormous harm, likely more harm than amoralism, immoralism, or conscious self-
ishness. Thus, although nothing earth-shattering hangs on its really being the great-
est vice, acknowledging the importance of this vice is a corrective to common moral 
thinking, a corrective with significant effects on the practice of ethics.
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